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Monitoring Elections
in El Salvador and
Nicaragua
Jack Spence
I
would like to thank Bing Chen for his efforts over many months to put this event
together. He first invited me in early 1993. While I was in El Salvador last year, it
seemed that Jimmy Carter might attend. By this fall Chen had managed to nail Fred's
[Frederick Gamst's] and my shoes to the floor, and then pursued peripatetic Padraig
[O'Malley] with a barrage of faxes over Southern Africa.
I observed the February 1990 elections in Nicaragua as a member of both the Latin
American Studies Association observation team and that of Hemisphere Initiatives, a
group with which I have worked. In El Salvador I headed the Hemisphere Initiatives
team. I visited Nicaragua five times during the electoral period, and for El Salvador, for
once my academic calendar coincided with Salvadoran history. A sabbatical in the last
academic year allowed me to be there during the electoral period.
I should say by way of comparison with Fred Gamst's presentation about Ethiopia
that Nicaragua and El Salvador are ethnically and linguistically homogeneous societies
in which the conflicts that led to war were based on class divisions and ideology. The
main exception to this general pattern would be the geographically isolated Atlantic
coast region of Nicaragua, which is ethnically and linguistically complex and has about
10 percent of the country's population. In El Salvador the indigenous population that
survived into this century was largely destroyed or driven underground in 1932 when
the government and landowners slaughtered people they suspected of participating in a
revolt against coffee plantation owners.
Background of Elections in Nicaragua
and El Salvador
The chronology handed out summarizes events in those two countries with an emphasis
on elections and international negotiations. To refresh your memories: in Nicaragua, the
leftist Sandinistas overthrew a long-standing, U.S.-supported dictatorial family, the
Somozas, in July 1979. By 1981, the Reagan administration was financing and organiz-
ing a war of counterrevolutionaries (contras) to do away with the Sandinistas.
In El Salvador in 1979, several leftist guerrilla groups that coalesced in 1980 into the
Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN), and a broad array of militant grassroots
groups threatened to overthrow a military government, which was replaced in October
of 1979 by a reformist civilian military government. This government, however, was not
willing or able to stop human rights abuses, which in fact rapidly escalated. Despite
high levels of human rights abuses, including the assassination of the archbishop in
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March 1990, the Carter administration increased military aid in 1980. By April the
country was in a civil war, the government pitted against the FMLN guerrillas. The first
Reagan administration (1981-1984) then made quantum leaps in that aid and supported
elections to legalize the government as well as to convince congressional critics that aid
was going to a democracy. The FMLN and the civilian left boycotted the first several
rounds of these elections.
Throughout the 1980s wars raged on in both countries. They created enormous social
and physical destruction, considering that they employed aerial bombing to a relatively
limited extent. Some 75,000, mostly civilians, were killed in El Salvador, a country the
size of Massachusetts with a population somewhat smaller at 5 million. Fifty thousand
were killed in Nicaragua in the 1980s, and in the 1978-1979 war that toppled Somoza,
in which he employed numerous air attacks on urban centers, another 25,000 to 30,000
died. By way of contrast, the United States, with eighty times the population of Nicara-
gua, had fewer casualties in Vietnam than the number of those in either Nicaragua or El
Salvador, and the United States was traumatized. It is impossible to find adults in either
Nicaragua or El Salvador who have not lost friends or relatives, and in rural areas the
losses were much greater. Economic losses were mammoth. One billion in capital,
roughly one year's gross export earnings, left El Salvador in the early 1980s. In Nicara-
gua the economy declined some 24 percent in the late 1980s, and in 1988 the inflation
rate was 30,000 percent, too high to measure accurately. The economy was in free fall
and chaotic, far worse than the war-damaged Salvadoran economy.
The Peace Process Elections
In both countries, as illustrated in Table 1, their 1979 break with past authoritarian
governments had been followed by elections and new constitutions, the 1984 election in
Nicaragua and a series of elections in El Salvador. But these elections had not been
accepted as legitimate by the armed opposition in each country, by several civilian
politically conservative anti-Sandinista groups in Nicaragua, and until the 1989 elec-
tion, by exiled civilian leftist groups in El Salvador.
The two elections in question, that of 1990 in Nicaragua and March 1994 in El Sal-
vador, were part of a peace process in each country. In Nicaragua the war was not over
and the contra army remained in the field, but conservative political groups, including
conservatives who had previously been in the civilian leadership of the U.S.-supported
contras, agreed to participate if the electoral processes were free and fair. They had
refused to participate in the 1984 election.
In El Salvador, the war was over but the elections were a key part of the implementa-
tion phases of the peace process. They were the first in which the FMLN guerrillas
would participate. In both countries, they were the first ever in which all political
groups from left to right would be represented and in which there would be no military
candidate. Were they not perceived as being free and fair elections, legitimating elec-
tions, the peace processes would have been gravely, perhaps mortally, wounded.
As part of the guarantee for these "peace process" elections, 1990 in Nicaragua and
1994 in El Salvador, there was extensive outside observation of the elections, particu-
larly by the UN, and in Nicaragua by the Organization of American States (OAS) as
well. While this now seems commonplace, at the time, Nicaragua, in 1990, had far and
away the most thoroughly and extensively internationally observed election ever. Since
then, election observation has been a growth business. Between the OAS and the UN
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there were 900 election day observers in Nicaragua for some 4,000 polling places, plus
another 1,500 invited and uninvited observers representing governments to small church
groups. More important, several dozen UN and OAS observers, and a half dozen other
small groups including the Latin American Studies Association, Hemisphere Initiatives.
and the Carter Center, watched the entire electoral process from the negotiation of the
ground rules to voter registration to the campaigns. For example, every campaign rally
had international observers. It was really the first time that election observation was
taken to mean something more extensive than the few days surrounding an election.
An essential difference between the two elections, however, was that while the par-
ties considered the UN and other outside observers to be, in a sense, a guarantor for free
and fair elections, or at least a mediator and relatively impartial witness, the U.S. posi-
tion in Nicaragua in 1989 was that only the ongoing presence of the contra army would
put sufficient pressure on the Sandinistas to have a free and fair election. That is, the
Nicaraguan election not only was held during a war that seemed to be dwindling down,
but the threat was that if the elections results were "wrong," the United States and the
contras would continue the war.
At issue, then, is the extent to which these two elections contributed to the peace
process in their respective countries. To what extent did they contribute to a process of
democratization? And to what extent did international observation contribute to these
contributions?
Contributions to the Peace Process
It is clear that the elections contributed to both of these processes and were necessary,
but not sufficient, elements to each process. Had the elections been a blatant fraud, both
countries would have been very different. It is virtually certain that Nicaragua would
have plunged back into a re-escalated war. It is harder to say that about El Salvador,
which was twenty-six months into an implementation of a peace treaty at the time of
the election, but it is far from inconceivable that at least portions of the FMLN would
have restocked their military supplies.
I would also argue that although a necessary part of the peace process, the elections
were, among other necessary parts, a relatively minor part, and in each case the results
of the election, more than the fairness of the electoral process itself, may have enhanced
the peace process. This is a negative, though hypothetical, judgment to make on the
election's contribution, as "who won" is not supposed to be an element in deciding
whether it was free and fair.
Of more importance to the peace process are agreements about stopping fighting,
laying down arms, and providing security guarantees, which usually also imply some
economic promises, to those most closely involved in the fighting. This was not accom-
plished in Angola, for example, where the "peace process" elections proved to be but a
brief interlude in a war even more destructive than those in Central America.
Of course, it had not been accomplished in Nicaragua either. But in that case the
electoral candidate backed by the United States and by the contras, Violeta Chamorro
and her thirteen-party UNO coalition, won, and the Sandinistas honored the results and
insisted that there would be no purge of the country's military, no replacement of it by
the contras. Had the results been the other way, it is far from clear that the Bush admin-
istration, the contras, sectors of Chamorro's coalition, to say nothing of Jesse Helms,
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Table 1
Year
Chronology of War and Elections in El Salvador and Nicaragua
El Salvador Nicaragua U.S. /International
1931,
1978
1979
1980
1932 slaughter of insur- U.S. appointed military head;
rectionists; military runs Somoza takes over, murders
government for large nationalist Sandino.
landowners.
Coup; "liberal" military Sandinistas oust [son of]
civilian junta takes power. Somoza.
Carter distances United
States from Somoza,
Salvadoran military.
Carter backs "new" Salva-
Archbishop assassinated; "Moderates" quit government,
^oran govt; cool relations
civil war begins. with Nicaragua. Reagan
elected
1981 FMLN final offensive fails. U.S. contra war begins.
1 982 Constituent Assembly
elections/FMLN boycotts
1983 New constitution; in war, War escalates.
FMLN gains; U.S. military
aid up; helicopters.
"Covert" aid to contras,
massive aid to Salvador
through 1980s
CIA actions in Nicaragua
discovered; Congress
protests.
Latin peace process under
way; over nonmilitary contra
aid.
1984
1985
Duarte elected; failed
talks with FMLN.
Ortega and Constitutional
Assembly elected; civilian
rights boycott.
Centrist Christian Demo- Economic plunge begins;
crats win assembly elec- Soviet helicopters in war.
tion.
1986 War grinds on.
1987 War grinds on.
1 988 ARENA wins assembly
election.
1989 FMLN changes negotia-
tion stance/ARENA's
Cristiani elected/Tet
offensive; Jesuits assas-
sinated.
War grinds on.
War grinds on.
Tenative peace moves
Reagan reelected; aid to
Salvador no longer contended;
peace process thwarted.
U.S. Congress votes $100
million military aid to
contras in June. Iran
contragate scandal engulfs
Reagan administration.
Arias peace treaty
Bush elected.
Election campaign conserva- In Nicaragua Bush keeps the
tives participate in UNO contras at war to guarantee
coalition; UN and OAS ob- free elections. In December
serve but contra war goes on U.S. invades Panama,
at lower level.
1990 Peace negotiations begin. Chamorro and UNO elected in
February; military headed by
Humberto Ortega; contra war
ends.
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Year El Salvador Nicaragua U.S. /International
1991
1992
1993
1994
Peace negotiations
conclude Decem-
ber 31.
Treaty signed; imple-
mentation crises;
modest economic
growth.
Election of century
campaign begins;
modest economic
growth.
ARENA wins presi-
dency. Assembly and
municipal elections/
FMLN finishes second.
Contra land takeovers; UNO
splits.
Land takeovers; more UNO
splits; economic crisis
Mass protests, unemploy-
ment, land crises
Constitutional crisis over
power of president/
Sandinista divisions
Clinton elected; Senator Helms
offensive on Nicaragua.
Helms, chairman of Foreign
Relations Committee
1997 ARENA loses ground, Aleman defeats FSLN Ortega Continued Helms pressure on
FMLN gains in assem- for president and wins con- U.S. "citizen" land claims in
bly and municipal trol of assembly in tarnished Nicaragua; declined U.S. pres-
elections, elections. ence in El Salvador
Under the Salvadoran 1983 Constitution, assembly and local elections are held every three years,
presidential elections every five years; no successive terms for presidents. Under the Nicaraguan 1987
Constitution, all presidential, assembly, and municipal elections coincided every six years, with
reelection permitted. In 1995, presidential terms were for five years with no successive terms, other
terms four years. Both countries employ proportional representation for assembly elections.
would have accepted the results and brought the war to an end — though I must admit
that Bush would have faced increasing difficulties in getting Congress to appropriate
funds for the contras.
Had the FMLN won the election in El Salvador, it is not clear that the military, pro-
testations to the contrary notwithstanding, or, according to interviews of major coffee
growers conducted by sociologist Jeffrey Paige, powerful business sectors would have
been prepared to accept the election. I would not say that war would have broken out in
that event, but short of that, there would have been an increase in death squad activity,
the military would have pressured the incoming government in numerous ways, and
there would have been massive capital flight.
As it stands, the post-electoral period and post-peace treaty period in El Salvador
has been tranquil (relative to Nicaragua, not relative to Massachusetts) because a de-
tailed treaty, however filled with crisis points and watered-down implementation, made
at least minimal provision for laying down arms and for providing for ex-combatants,
with considerable U.S. and international aid to back it up. However, it is important to
note here that during the election campaign and since the election, five prominent mem-
bers of the FMLN have been gunned down. There have been no arrests. Though the
government has been quick to assert that these people have been victims of El
Salvador's intensive crime wave, no one in the government has been similarly gunned
down.
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In Nicaragua, and despite a very clean election and results the contras wanted, the
country has been plagued for four years by numerous armed bands of contras making
not only economic demands but high-level political demands (the minister of defense
Humberto Ortega should be fired and so should the minister of the presidency,
Chamorro's son-in-law Antonio Lacayo), demands which have been loudly echoed in
Washington by Senator Helms — actually, it is not clear who is echoing whom.
Have Elections Contributed to Democratization?
Again yes, in the sense that blatant frauds would have done the reverse. But taking any
definition of democracy even slightly more ample than simply requiring regularly
scheduled elections with open campaigning and accurate vote counting, the elections
were but one piece in a complex puzzle of democratization. In El Salvador, despite
extensive international observation, nudging, and lobbying, the elections were not con-
ducted very well.
In addition, in El Salvador, up until four months ago [August 1994] the entire Su-
preme Court was selected for five-year terms by the majority party in the assembly, and
the Supreme Court in turn selected the lower court judges and controlled their budgets.
That this system has recently been changed is not the result of the "elections of the
century" but rather of the FMLN's insistence on judicial reform in the peace negotia-
tions.
With several thousand instances of human rights abuses, the court and police systems
have had two successful prosecutions in fifteen years involving military defendants, and
one of those was overturned by an amnesty law passed literally hours after a UN-
selected Truth Commission mandated under the accords had named names in notorious
cases of human rights abuses. [That remains true in October 1998.]
In both countries, the military retains virtual administrative and budgetary autonomy
from the legislature. The assembly can veto a budget bottom line, but can't, or won't,
examine its components. That is changing in Nicaragua. In El Salvador it is politically
inconceivable that there would be a civilian minister of defense. Though the peace
process drastically reduced the size of the armies in each country, in El Salvador all the
officer corps remain but with relatively few troops to command.
My point here is not to fault the elections and their results for not changing all of
this. Democratization is a process, and it would not be fair to charge any election with
the whole job. Rather it is to say that the electoral process has made only small contri-
butions in other institutional areas and that the international spotlight shines brightest
only on election day — after that the U.S. president, at least if happy with the results,
can declare that X and Y countries have joined the democratic team.
Did the electoral process in its own terms contribute to democratization? First, it
should be noted that whether these two elections would be part of the democratizing
process was and remains a contested issue. The Sandinistas claim that the 1984 election
was democratic; what was undemocratic was that the United States and the contras did
not accept the results. The conservative governing party ARENA in El Salvador makes
similar claims about the seven elections that preceded the 1994 election.
In terms of conduct, the Nicaraguan election gets much better grades than the El
Salvador election. Though turnout was considerably higher in both countries than in
previous elections, the voter registration and voting processes in El Salvador effectively
excluded several tens of thousands of potential voters and did so with a heavy bias
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against the poor, particularly those in former war zones. Voter registration was legally
cumbersome, particularly for peasants without birth certificates, time-consuming, ex-
pensive, and geographically inconvenient for many. So was voting, and there was much
confusion at polling places, resulting in some 25,000 to 80,000 who showed up with
voting card in hand being unable to vote. At least 80,000 who attempted to register
never received a card.
In a country in which pre-election surveys showed high levels of cynicism about the
electoral process among a substantial minority of the population — more than one-third
said that the elections would be fraudulent; fewer than a third said that they would be
free and fair— the election, despite a higher turnout of voters who could vote, did not
do much to allay cynicism.
In Nicaragua these processes were a model of efficiency and fairness under the ad-
ministration of the Supreme Electoral Council, as they had been in 1984. The cam-
paign, however, was one in which a foreign power was an open, if legal, contributor to
one of the sides.
Did the Observers Make a Difference?
Yes. In Nicaragua, while there were many campaign complaints from both sides about
harassment, complaints that shared the distinction of being most difficult to verify, the
contenders in general agreed that the observers headed off crises and built some faith in
opponents in the Electoral Commission, which they conceived of as being controlled by
the Sandinistas. What aided this process was when the Democrat Jimmy Carter and the
Republican Eliot Richardson, who was working with the UN, themselves gave good
preliminary grades to the conduct of voter registration and the general conduct of the
election campaign period. (Had the results come out the other way, the effects of the
UN, and Richardson, and Carter giving the election a good grade would have placed
some constraints on Bush's actions.)
In El Salvador, the outside observers, in the months before the election, clearly
helped to improve a flawed process. For several months, for example, the UN observers
were providing most of the rural transportation for electoral authorities during the regis-
tration process, an action that clearly exceeded the UN terms of reference. Many more
people would have been excluded from voting.
There are, however, costs and limits. In El Salvador, I would estimate the costs of
financing international observation on election day only (counting air fares, housing,
food, and ground transportation) to amount to at least $2 per vote cast. For those who
make the minimum wage in El Salvador (and many make less), that amounts to half a
day's wage. The entire election, counting campaign, administration, and observation
costs, was far more expensive than that.
The UN style is to be as obvious as possible. It wants people to know that they are
being observed. But in a poor country, the wealth such a style involves, plus the high
salaries paid to UN observers, creates some resentment among poor and rich — the
poor for obvious reasons, the rich because the UN observers drive up the cost of high-
end housing. There is also an understandable nationalist sentiment: Who are these out-
siders to grade us? In Nicaragua, after I was introduced at a social event as an election
observer, a Nicaraguan brightly welcomed me and said he looked forward to seeing me
in the United States the following year. When I asked why he would be visiting the
United States, he said he hoped to come to observe election procedures in Chicago.
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Finally, though the UN had a seasoned team of observers in the months preceding the
election, its massive election day team — and this would be true for the OAS in Nicara-
gua as well — included many people who had little observing experience and no back-
ground in the country, although, unlike other election observation teams, a majority
spoke Spanish. When troubles arose in El Salvador, they were less than clear about
what they should do.
The Prospects
Progress has been made. The elections were procedurally excellent in Nicaragua and
mediocre in El Salvador with its bias against the poor. Turnout was excellent in Nicara-
gua, only fair in El Salvador — but on a par with the United States. Reform of the Su-
preme Court has begun in El Salvador with consensus building in the assembly; in
Nicaragua, after some years of division and stalemate, the assembly seems to have
fashioned a working majority, ironically including Sandinistas, which is providing some
stability. In Nicaragua, there is a tradition of grassroots participation between the elections.
Without international observation the next time, however, it is not clear to me how
El Salvador will improve its electoral procedural behavior, though there is a chance that
there will be reform in this area, at least legislated if not implemented.
The main concern for each country takes opposite directions. The UNO coalition of thir-
teen parties had one thing in common: dislike of the Sandinistas. It is now badly divided, if it
can even be said to exist. The governing system has barely governed, and economic growth has
been nonexistent. Unemployment is extremely high. In both countries crime, violent crime, is
at shocking levels. Jesse Helms will likely cut off all aid to Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, despite
the civic virtues of the election, I believe, after four years of no progress, there is deep cyni-
cism among the electorate. The governing system is fragmented and just barely a system. A
right-wing, authoritarian anti-Sandinista is the current front runner for the 1996 election. In
short, were there an election tomorrow, I would predict a drastic reduction in turnout and an
electoral result that would either be a one-person authoritarian president or a continuation of
political fragmentation so extreme as to make the country barely governable.
In El Salvador we have the opposite of fragmentation. Quite apart from the ongoing pres-
ence of death squads, apparently now also tied to drug running, the rightistARENA has just won, by
a commanding margin at all levels, its second consecutive election. Though it got but 44 percent in
the assembly election, it has a working majority and confronts an opposition divided into three or
four parties, the larger ones of which, including the FMLN, are in the process of dividing. It won 68
percent of the presidential runoff vote, and with a winner-take-all system in municipal elections, it
has undivided control of municipal councils in 80 percent of the municipalities despite winning 44
percent of the vote. It is also the party that 99 percent of the wealthy people in the country support,
which outspent its opposition in the election campaign by extremely large margins. A one-party
state may be on the horizon.
These futures, should they come to pass, are not entirely the product of the very destructive wars,
but they are in no small part shaped by them. The wars have ended and elections have been held,
but reconstruction, economic well-being for the majority, reconciliation, and a deep-seated democ-
ratization with incentives to participate at the grassroots remain distant goals. $g
This speech was originally delivered at the Distinguished Lecture Series, University of
Massachusetts Boston, December 12, 1994.
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Reflections on Elections and
Peace Four Years Later
When asked in October 1998 to draft a brief postscript to the foregoing speech on
elections and peace, I was discomfited to note that I had concluded the December
1994 lecture with several forthright predictions that are now hard to ignore.
Since the lecture, both Nicaragua and El Salvador experienced another major elec-
tion round, while Nicaragua also held two regional elections in its two theoretically
autonomous, ethnically diverse Atlantic Coast regions. Presidential, National Assembly,
and municipal elections, including direct mayoral elections for the first time, took place
in Nicaragua in October 1996. El Salvador had National Assembly and municipal elec-
tions in March 1997, and presidential elections will be held in March 1999.
El Salvador
My predictions that El Salvador might be headed toward a one-party state have so far
happily proved to be off the mark. The rightist ARENA party suffered a major decline
in March 1997, going from 39 to 28 seats in the assembly and polling 35 percent fewer
votes than it had in 1994. By contrast, the up-and-coming former guerrilla group, the
Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN), despite a major party split in the year fol-
lowing the 1994 elections, improved its vote by 28.5 percent and almost tied ARENA
with 27 seats. The balance of 29 seats was divided among seven other parties, still leav-
ing ARENA with a working majority in spite of facing major difficulties for votes that
require more than a 50 percent majority, for example, ratification of international agree-
ments. More impressive, the FMLN moved from winning fourteen tiny municipalities
of 262 in 1994 to fifty-three in 1997, including the capital city and five of the next six
largest cities. A former rural guerrilla force, it demonstrated real urban vote-getting
prowess.
ARENA'S decline was owing to several publicized, though unproven, heavy contact
internal fights, a president widely perceived as weak, and a sharp economic decline
following several years of growth. Its vast resources for campaigns, however, make it
the strong favorite for next year's presidential elections. Its control of government re-
mains firm.
Nevertheless, El Salvador continued to suffer from mediocre electoral processes.
Because a poorly administered system has rules that make voting and registering much
more difficult for poor rural voters, it is biased in ARENA'S favor. For example,
ARENA has buried proposals that would permit people to vote in their own neighbor-
hood rather than travel to distant locales. There are no controls or even records kept on
campaign financing. Incumbents can abuse state power to a degree unimaginable in the
United States, for instance, mounting government-paid-for television advertisements
promoting a government agency that are actually thinly disguised campaign propa-
ganda.
On the other hand, the more serious doubts about electoral democracy in El Salvador
passed a sterner test in 1997. I felt that the right would not accept an FMLN victory in
1994, but did not have to worry about that theoretical possibility. The proof of the
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honesty of a system is not demonstrated as much in an election in which those who run
the system are likely, with a fair vote, to win easily, as in 1994. In March 1997 one
might have predicted that ARENA, which clearly was not going to lose control of the
state, would stoop to fraud as the results were going to be close, but there was little
evidence that it did.
It can also be said that peace has held in El Salvador, and fair elections have made a
contribution to it. But El Salvador at peace is more dangerous than when it was at war,
with its homicide rate some forty times that of the United States, one year topping even
Colombia in world rankings. This violence is no doubt related to the war — high levels
of postwar unemployment, a male population broadly skilled in the use of weapons,
rampant and untreated post-traumatic stress disorder.
Other aspects of the transition to peace and full participation democracy have not
been impressive. Voting turnout was 17 percent lower than in 1994 and remains at me-
diocre levels, and between elections political participation in citizens groups is ex-
tremely low by U.S. standards. The judicial system, despite having the best Supreme
Court ever, has been very slow to rid itself of corrupt and incompetent judges through-
out the system. A brand-new police force, although certainly better than the old human
rights abusers, has itself been accused of corruption, abuse of authority, and incompe-
tence and has been engulfed by a volcanic increase in crime.
Nicaragua
I predicted an electorate, made cynical by a policy that since the end of the war had
been subjected to a crisis over every major fundamental issue a national government
might face, would not turn out to vote as it had, in very high numbers, in the previous
two post-Somoza elections and that it would likely elect Arnoldo Aleman, a rightist
populist with authoritarian tendencies, as president. They turned out in high numbers,
but they elected Aleman.
On the other hand, I did not anticipate that the legislature would, before the 1997
election, pass a series of constitutional amendments and laws which would limit the
strong presidential powers in Nicaragua, making it difficult for an authoritarian. The
president's controls over making international agreements, appointing heads of the
military and members of the Supreme Court, for example, are sharply limited by legis-
lative strength and, in the case of the military, institutional authority.
I also did not anticipate that Nicaragua's best government institution, the Supreme
Electoral Council, would be subjected to a series of legal changes, budgetary pressures,
and mandated politicization that would make it considerably less effective and result in
a 1997 election day process marked by irregularities and significant chaos. This was in
sharp contrast to the model elections it administered under intense international scrutiny
in 1984 and 1990. The changes required the Supreme Electoral Council to appoint as
regional electoral authorities, rather than professional staff, people nominated by politi-
cal parties, to train the appointees, and at the same time, to implement a new photo ID
system, all with a reduced budget. It performed well, but a greatly expanded electorate,
high turnout, and lack of experience and shenanigans resulted in long delays in vote
counts, recounts, and missing ballots.
I also did not anticipate that the Sandinistas, the former left ruling party, would
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undergo a split and, subsequent to the election, suffer a major political crisis when its
leader, former Nicaraguan president and 1997 candidate Daniel Ortega, would be pub-
licly accused of sexual abuse by his stepdaughter.
Eight years after the end of the war, armed groups are still making semipolitical
demands despite all predictions that they would fade away once their favorite candidate,
and friend, Aleman was elected. The economy remains in a mess with unemployment
rates at staggering levels for the eighth consecutive year and little new investment de-
spite Aleman's election. The court system, at some levels, remains politicized, and the
two large parties have been agreeing to tinker with the electoral rules in their favor, not
that of the small parties.
Though the conditions in almost all areas save crime are better in El Salvador — and
crime is pretty bad in Nicaragua — each country has had a measure of success in
mounting legitimating elections with results recognized by the opposition, which con-
tributed to an end to their wars. But each country retains significant remnants of its
authoritarian and corrupt pre- 1980 past, sometimes manifesting themselves in new
institutional clothing. It must also be said, however, that the military institution in each
has gone through major change. In Nicaragua, civilians across a wide political spectrum
and the Chamorro government agreed to a military law professionalizing and regulating
the military, including the manner of selecting its top command. Its numbers and budget
are 20 percent of what they were in the 1980s, and there is no draft. The El Salvador
military has a distinctly lower profile and even the FMLN points to the success of mili-
tary reform, in contrast to the country's slowness of reform in civilian areas.
Neither country has overcome the damage and scars of the wars in which their soci-
eties were shredded and their economies damaged or, in the case of Nicaragua, devas-
tated.
El Salvador's economy is in better shape because many more Salvadorans left for the
United States during the war and send much more money home. That is, this economic
benefit has come at the expense of ripping the fabric of the society. This country did a
relatively good job of holding the Salvadoran economy together during the war and an
even better job of tearing Nicaragua's apart.
The chief obstacle to promoting peace and transition to democracy in each country is
that broad sectors of the population have little faith or stake in the government systems
because the peace process and electoral democracy have done little of direct relevance
to alleviate their poverty-stricken conditions. Solving that problem is far beyond the
expertise of international electoral observers.
Addendum
The above reflections were written in October 1998. I write these lines on December
20, 1998. In November Central America was devastated by hurricane Mitch, with dam-
age in Nicaragua and Honduras by far the heaviest. Relief workers estimated some
10,000 dead in the two countries and damage that would take, assuming very large
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international help, more than a decade to repair. Every year there are headlines about
hurricanes, but this was the worst of the century in the region. To call it a natural disas-
ter, however, disguises the human, political element. Agricultural policy for centuries
has favored a few owners of very large estates at the expense of the rural majority. Land
shortages force people to live up the sides of mountains. Money shortages force them to
use trees for cooking fuel. Deforestation follows, so heavy rains cause erosion. A major
storm creates a mud slide, and mud slides can move much faster than a human, or a
horse, can run. Whole villages were wiped out. It is not clear what this will mean politi-
cally for Nicaragua, but the Aleman government, suspecting Sandinista mayors were
exaggerating the dangers as the rains poured down, minimized the danger and damage.
When this blunder was clear, it attempted to control relief funds.
Nicaragua's last quarter century of suffering is of Old Testament proportions. In
1 972 Managua suffered a massive earthquake with more than 20,000 killed. Somoza,
the dictator, used aid funds to his own benefit. The 1978-1979 war against Somoza left
tens of thousands dead and an economy so ruined that the United Nations declared that
under "the best of circumstances," recovery from the war would not be complete until
the end of the century. Rather than the best of circumstances, the Reagan administration
financed a war against the Sandinistas that lasted ten years. Economic ruin far exceeded
that of the prior war. Nature brought a major hurricane in 1988. Deforestation brought
several years of drought. Then there was a tidal wave and volcanic eruptions. With the
end of the millennium a year off, Mitch arrived. $g
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